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Abstract  System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) from Leveson is a tech-
nique for hazard analysis developed to identify more thoroughly the causal factors 
in complex safety-critical systems, including software design errors. Event-B is a 
proof-based modelling language and method that  enables the development of 
specifications using a formal notion of refinement. We propose an approach to 
hazard analysis where system requirements are captured as monitored, controlled, 
mode and commanded phenomena and STPA is applied to the controlled phenom-
ena to identify systematically the safety constraints. These are then represented 
formally in an Event-B specification which is amenable to formal refinement and 
proof. 
1 Introduction 
System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), described in (Leveson 2012), is a 
technique for hazard analysis developed to identify more thoroughly the causal 
factors in complex safety-critical systems, including software design errors. STPA 
has been applied to a wide range of safety critical applications (Leveson 2012). 
Event-B (Abrial 2010) is a proof-based modelling language and method that en-
ables the development of specifications using a formal notion of refinement. The 
Rodin platform (Abrial et al. 2010) is the Eclipse-based IDE that provides auto-
mated support for Event-B modelling, refinement and mathematical proof. The 
Event-B method has also been used in the deployment of safety critical systems 
for automotive and railway applications. 
We propose an approach to hazard analysis where system requirements are cap-
tured as monitored, controlled, mode and commanded phenomena and STPA is 
applied to the controlled phenomena to identify systematically the safety con-
straints. These are then represented formally in an Event-B specification, which is 
amenable to formal refinement and proof. 232      John Colley and Michael Butler 
 
In Section 2 we provide an overview of Event-B with particular attention paid 
to formal Event-B refinement. 
In Section 3 we show how our proposed approach to hazard analysis can be ap-
plied, using a domestic washing machine case study, to derive systematically the 
safety constraints expressed in natural language. 
In Section 4 we illustrate how the natural language safety constraints can be 
represented formally in Event-B. 
In Section 5 we present a summary of our approach and the direction of our fu-
ture work.  
2 Event-B 
In Event-B, an abstract model comprises a machine that specifies the high-level 
behaviour and a context, made up of sets, constants and their properties, that 
represents the type environment for the high-level machine. The machine is repre-
sented as a set of state variables, v and a set of events, guarded atomic actions, 
which modify the state. If more than one action is enabled, then one is chosen 
non-deterministically for execution, an observable transition on the state variables 
which must preserve an invariant on the variables, I(v). 
A more concrete representation of the machine may then be created which re-
fines the abstract machine, and the abstract context may be extended to support the 
types required by the refinement. Gluing invariants are used to verify that the 
concrete machine is a correct refinement: any behaviour of the concrete machine 
must satisfy the abstract behaviour. Gluing invariants give rise to proof obliga-
tions for pairs of abstract and corresponding concrete events. Events may also 
have parameters, which take, non-deterministically, the values that will make the 
guards in which they are referenced true. 
Event-B refinement allows a model to be built gradually (Abrial and 
Hallerstede 2006), starting with an abstract model and then introducing succes-
sive, more concrete refinements. Adding variables achieves spatial extension and 
adding events temporal extension. Events in the abstract model may be refined by 
one or more events in the concrete model. These concrete events can modify the 
state of new variables introduced in the refinement, but must preserve the behav-
iour with regard to the variables declared in the abstract model. New events may 
also be introduced in the refinement. These events are not allowed to assign values 
to abstract variables, but can assign values to new variables introduced in the re-
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3 The washing machine case study 
We use this case study to explore a systematic method for identifying both func-
tional and safety requirements. We start with an overview of the washing machine 
system. 
3.1 System overview 
We are concerned with developing a master controller, which, on receiving a set 
of user settings from the control panel, will control the water drum system and 
agitator motor to comply with those user settings. 
3.2 Discovering the functional requirements 
We investigate the functional requirements using a method that identifies the sys-
tem phenomena and then structures the functional requirements according to these 
phenomena (Yeganefard and Butler 2012). The phenomena that we shall explore 
are  the  monitored phenomena,  commanded  phenomena,  controlled  phenomena 
and mode phenomena. 
3.3 Monitored phenomena 
First we examine the phenomena that will be monitored by the washing machine 
controller. 
3.3.1 Drum water level 
The controller will receive the current level from the water level sensor. 
3.3.2 Drum water temperature 
The controller will receive the current temperature from the water temperature 
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3.3.3 Door position 
The controller will receive from the door sensor whether the door is closed or 
open. 
3.3.4 Vibration level 
The controller will receive from the vibration sensor the level of vibration. 
3.4 The commanded phenomena 
These are the phenomena that are driven by the user through the washing machine 
control panel. 
3.4.1 Water level setting 
The controller will receive the water level setting from the control panel. In this 
case two settings are possible: half load and full load. 
3.4.2 Cycle setting 
The controller will receive the cycle setting identifier from the control panel and 
decode the cycle setting. The cycle setting consists of 
•  the mode sequence, for example: idle, wash, rinse, spin, rinse, spin, idle 
•  the mode duration: how long each mode will run 
•  the spin speed. 
3.4.3 Water temperature setting 
The controller will receive the water temperature setting from the control panel: 
30, 40 or 60 degrees Celsius. 
3.4.4 Start signal 
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3.5 The controlled phenomena 
These are the phenomena that are driven by the master controller. 
3.5.1 Door lock 
•  The controller will lock the door at the start of the cycle. 
•  The controller will unlock the door at the end of the cycle. 
•  The door will remain locked during the cycle. 
3.5.2 Agitator motor 
•  The controller directs the speed and rotation direction of the agitator motor.  
•  The agitator motor will be stationary when the door is unlocked. 
3.5.3 Water control valves 
The controller activates and de-activates the hot and cold water valves to meet the 
water level and temperature requirements. 
3.5.4 Water drain pump 
The controller activates the water drain pump to meet the water level require-
ments. 
3.5.5 Heater 
The controller activates and de-activates the heater to meet the temperature re-
quirements. 
3.6 The mode phenomena 
The controller modes are idle, washing, rinsing and spinning. 236      John Colley and Michael Butler 
 
3.7 Discovering the safety requirements 
The following two quotations from (Leveson 2012) encapsulate the approach to 
safety analysis, developed by Leveson, which we use in the case study. 
Any controller – human or automated – needs a model of the process being controlled to 
control it effectively. 
Accidents can occur when the controller’s process model does not match the state of t he 
system being controlled and the controller issues unsafe commands. 
Simply trying to make components more reliable does not in itself make a system 
safer. Safety is enhanced when the controller(s) respond to component failures in a 
way which ensures that the resulting hazards are correctly and safely managed. 
Consider a potential hazard arising from the heater sub-system of the washing 
machine. The water could overheat dangerously if the controller cannot monitor 
water temperature properly. If the temperature sensor is faulty, the controller 
could switch off the heater if the value read from sensor is out of operating range. 
If, however, the sensor reports a value within the operating range but the actual 
value is out of operating range, how can the controller respond to this hazard? 
Sensor redundancy, with the introduction of a voting system in the controller, can 
decrease the probability that the hazard will not be detected. An alternative ap-
proach, however, is for the controller to predict the rise in water temperature and 
compare it with the reported rise. 
The controller needs independent verification of the sensed values to detect 
failure. This can be provided by values from a different sensor or the controller 
can generate predicted values in the absence of other sources of data. 
3.8 System-Theoretic Process Analysis 
Leveson proposes a rigorous approach, System-Theoretic Process Analysis 
(STPA), which consists of the following three steps. 
1. Identify potentially hazardous control actions. 
2. Derive the safety constraints. 
3. Determine how unsafe control actions could occur. 
STPA has been used by the US Missile Defense Agency to characterize the resid-
ual safety risk of the ballistic missile defense system (Perreira et al. 2006). A 
simulator of the interceptor flight computer is used to predict the expected behav-
iour and therefore to detect a failure in the system. 
In our method, we perform a systematic analysis of the controlled phenomena 
identified in the requirements analysis: the door lock, the heater, the water drain 
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3.8.1 The door sub-system 
Consider a model of the controlled door sub-system as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Fig.1. The controlled door sub-system 
The main controller has a process model of the door sub-system. So also does the 
human operator. The operator can open or close the door directly. The controller 
uses an actuator to lock and unlock the door and a sensor to detect whether the 
door is open or closed. 
Step 1: identifying potentially hazardous control actions 
For each of the two controller actions, Unlock Door and Lock Door, we identify 
three potential causes of a hazard: not providing the action when it should, provid-
ing the action when it shouldn’t and providing the action at the wrong time or in 
the wrong order. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 1. 
Failing to unlock the door is inconvenient but not hazardous. Unlocking the 
door when the drum is filled is hazardous because the operator will be able to 
open the door inadvertently and release potentially very hot water. Unlocking the 
door before the drum has been fully drained is also hazardous. 238      John Colley and Michael Butler 
 
Table 1. Door hazards 
Controller action  Not providing causes 
hazard  Providing causes hazard  Wrong timing or 
order causes hazard 
Unlock Door  Not hazardous  Operator can open door 
with drum filled 
Water not fully 
drained 
Lock Door  Operator can open 
door with drum filled  Not hazardous  Water starts filling 
before lock 
Failing to lock the door when the drum is filled is hazardous, but locking the door 
when the drum is empty is not. Locking the door after the drum has started filling 
is hazardous. 
Step 2: deriving the safety constraints 
Three safety constraints can be derived from Table 1. 
1. The door must always be locked when there is water in the drum. 
2. An  Unlock Door  command must never be issued until the water is fully 
drained. 
3. A Lock Door command must be issued before starting to fill the drum. 
The first is an invariant of the system. The second and third are guards that pre-
vent an operation occurring in an unsafe way. These natural language invariants 
and guards can then be represented formally in an Event-B model, as we shall 
show in detail in Section 4. 
Step 3: determining how unsafe control actions could occur 
We now revisit the controlled door sub-system to determine systematically the 
potential causes of unsafe actions as shown in Figure 2. 
The hazard is that the door is open when there is water in the drum. The poten-
tial causes of this hazard are then represented on the diagram. The controller or the 
operator can have an inadequate or incorrect process model of the door sub-
system, the requirements may not be fully specified or implemented and the op-
erator may not be properly trained. The actuators and sensors may fail. These po-
tential causes of unsafe actions can be used to both improve the design and inform 
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Fig.2. Potential causes of unsafe actions 
4 Representing the safety constraints formally in Event-B 
4.1 The Abstract Model: the Door Sub-system 
To illustrate the method, we present first an abstract model of the washing ma-
chine door sub-system. We define an Event-B context as shown in Figure 3. 
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The position of the door can either be OPEN or CLOSED and the state of the door 
can either be LOCKED or UNLOCKED. 
We then define an Event-B machine, which sees this context, as shown in Fig-
ures 4 and 5. 
 
Fig.4. Door sub-system machine initialisation 
The variables dpos and doorst represent the door position, which is initialized to 
OPEN, and the door state, which is initialized to LOCKED. The invariant @inv3 
states that if the door is locked, then it must be closed. 
The events of the machine are shown in Figure 5. 
When the door is open, as indicated by the guard @grd1 in the event Close-
Door, then the door can be closed. The guards of event OpenDoor indicate that 
the door can only be opened if it is closed and unlocked. The event LockDoor is 
only enabled if the door is closed and unlocked. The event UnlockDoor unlocks 
the door if it is locked. 
The proof obligations for the machine are generated and discharged automati-
cally by the Rodin tool. In particular, we have proved that the invariant @inv3 is 
preserved for all possible interleavings of the events. 
4.2 The refined model: introducing the drum sub-system 
In the formal refinement of the abstract model, we first introduce the drum state in 
the context shown in Figure 6, which extends the abstract context. 
The drum is either EMPTY, FILLING, FILLED or EMPTYING. The refined 
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state of the drum, refines the events of the abstract machine and introduces the 
events shown in Figure 7. 
 
Fig.5. Door sub-system machine events 
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Fig.7. New events in the refinement 
The event FillDrum is only enabled if the door is locked (@grd1) and the drum is 
empty (@grd2). The  door can only be locked by the LockDoor  event. These 
guards therefore fulfil the requirement of the safety constraint: ‘A lock door com-
mand must be issued before starting to fill the drum’. 
To represent the safety constraint, ‘The door must always be locked when there 
is water in the drum’, we introduce the invariant shown in Figure 8. 
 
Fig.8. Safety constraint invariant 
However, when we run the automatic prover, we find that this invariant cannot be 
proved for the UnlockDoor event. Inspecting the failing proof more closely, we 
see that the door can be unlocked while the drum is not empty. We must therefore 
strengthen the guards of the abstract event in this refinement by introducing the 
extra guard, @grd2, as shown in Figure 9. 
This guard represents the safety constraint: ‘An Unlock Door command must 
never be issued until the water is fully drained.’ When we re-run the prover, the 
invariant, @inv2, is now proved automatically. All three safety constraints derived 
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1. The door must always be locked when there is water in the drum. 
2. An  Unlock Door  command must never be issued until the water is fully 
drained. 
3. A Lock Door command must be issued before starting to fill the drum. 
 
Fig.9. Safety constraint guard 
5 Summary and future work 
We have presented an approach to hazard analysis where system requirements are 
captured as monitored, controlled, mode and commanded phenomena and STPA is 
applied to the controlled phenomena to identify systematically the safety con-
straints. These natural language constraints are then represented formally in an 
Event-B specification, which is amenable to formal refinement and proof. We 
have shown how the safety constraints are represented as either invariants  or 
guards in the formal model. We build the model systematically using Event-B 
formal refinement. The Rodin environment automatically generates the required 
proof obligations, and the Rodin provers have been shown in this case study to 
discharge the proof obligations automatically. Where a proof obligation cannot be 
discharged, we have shown how the Rodin tool guides the user to improve the 
model. 
We have illustrated our approach using the door lock phenomenon. Application 
of the method continues by analyzing and modelling in the same way the remain-
ing controlled phenomena: the agitator motor, water control valves, water drain 
pump and water heater. 
It is an important goal of our work to integrate Event-B based formal verifica-
tion techniques into the overall system development flow. In particular, it is nec-
essary to validate the specification against the original requirements. This cannot 
be achieved in an ad hoc manner. It is necessary to trace elements of the specifica-
tion back to the requirements, and for this tool support is vital to ensure that there 
is a measurable way of ensuring that the requirements are covered by the specifi-
cation.  In future work,  therefore, we shall integrate our approach with the re-
quirements capture and tracing facility, ProR (Jastram 2010) that forms part of the 
Rodin platform. ProR provides a flexible and configurable environment to support 244      John Colley and Michael Butler 
 
requirements engineering, within which we will integrate requirements analysis 
and safety analysis within the Rodin toolset and workflow. 
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